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I. Introduction and Purpose 
 One of the greatest success stories for the proponents of international cooperation, the 
post-World War II period of the long and colorful history of the relationship between the United 
States and the United Kingdom has been marked by nearly seventy years of apparently 
uninterrupted cooperation, alliance and progress.  The bilateral agreements set between the two 
countries and the mutually acceptable policies that their governments set in both domestic and 
foreign spheres show the strength and vitality of the world’s first “special relationship” as 
dubbed by the British statesman Winston Churchill; in a similar address he noted the 
commonalities present between citizens of both countries, in regard for their defense of natural 
rights, justice and personal freedom:  “Let our common tongue, our common basic law, our joint 
heritage of literature and ideals, the red tie of kinship, become the sponge of obliteration of all 
the unpleasantness of the past.”1  Other heads of state, members of government, scholars and 
observers have championed the Anglo-American alliance in similar fashions throughout its 
existence. 
Underneath the records of positive news accounts, recollections of the countries’ leaders, 
and details of superficial history books, however, the complex special relationship between the 
United States and the United Kingdom is far more lopsided and inequitable in reality and 
practice.  As a result of its inception with the Atlantic Charter of 1941 between President 
Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill, British interests in maintaining their 
empire were exchanged for United States aid in the war effort against the Germans; a greater 
cause of self-determination among native peoples of colonial and oppressed areas was agreed to 
be pursued by both nations.  Such terms were clearly not in the best interests or policies of the 
British Empire when they were agreed upon.  American pressure upon Britain to decolonize its 
                                                 
1 Gilbert, Martin.  Churchill and America.  New York:  Free Press, 2005. xxi. 
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vast, global empire did not proceed without intensely detrimental effects upon the strength and 
vitality of the special relationship; the British ambassador to the United States in 1967 even went 
as far to refer to the “so-called Anglo-American special relationship” as “little more than 
sentimental terminology.”2  Further series of conflicts among former British colonial possessions 
and the American response to those incidents have created further discrepancies within special 
relationship between the two countries.   
Cooperation between states can occur as a result of those states changing or adapting 
their goals and programs for intended potential benefits, much as the United States and Britain 
have aligned their policies in both domestic and foreign affairs; however, as Leeds states, “these 
benefits cannot be achieved without active effort; the interests of the actors are not in harmony.  
Because mutual benefit is possible when policy is coordinated, state leaders wish to cooperate, 
but the condition of anarchy in the international system may make cooperation difficult to 
achieve.”3  While maintaining their agreements and alliance, both countries have striven to only 
incur costs that do not outweigh the benefits of these agreements; otherwise, the agreements 
would not return a favorable outcome for the country in question.  Based on studies that concern 
the special relationship, centered within some of the key compliance theories of international 
relations, however, the data seem to indicate that the benefits are far less substantial for the 
United Kingdom than for the United States. 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the relationship between the United States and 
the United Kingdom.  I will argue that British domestic and foreign policies have been shaped in 
certain areas by the existence and durability of its special relationship with the United States.  
                                                 
2 Hyam, Ronald.  Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Deolonisation, 1918-1968. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006. 28. 
3 Leeds, Brett Ashley.  1999.  “Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International 
Cooperation.”  American Journal of Political Science 43 (4): 981. 
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First, I will provide a historical background detailing the Anglo-American relationship, and then 
continue with a comparative literature review based on the themes of international cooperation.  
The paper will describe the theory of expected utility for both countries as a source of 
noncompliance, and examine two case studies that highlight the existence of pressure placed 
upon British government and its interests by the United States in the postwar period, specifically 
within the themes of decolonization and military action.  In doing so, the paper will support the 
argument that British domestic and foreign policies have been shaped in certain areas by the 
existence and durability of its special relationship with the United States. 
II. Historical Background to the Special Relationship 
The history of the connection between the United States and the United Kingdom began 
when colonists immigrated from England, either for religious or economic purposes, to the North 
American continent in the early seventeenth century, but the true partnership between the 
countries began over three hundred years later in the twentieth century.  Regardless of the 
commonalities of law, language, free enterprise and natural rights held in high regard by the 
citizens of both countries, the level of cooperation between the two remained distant at best 
throughout much of their mutual existence; American interests were primarily focused on 
domestic and hemispheric concerns until the twentieth century, while Britain dealt with the 
burdens and maintained the benefits of its vast, globe-circling empire.  Although trade and 
economic issues certainly grew during the nineteenth century, along with increasing ties felt by 
immigrants from Europe to the United States, close bilateral relations were not natural for the 
time, and were therefore not actively pursued by either government. 
Ironically, the first opportunity for a “special relationship” to be formed was not followed 
through, despite positive efforts from both countries.  After the American-aided victory in World 
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War I, President Woodrow Wilson, along with then Secretary of War Winston Churchill, hoped 
that the alliance would continue to evolve into a strong bilateral bond between the two countries; 
with Congress’ defeat of the Treaty of Versailles, however, such further American involvement 
overseas would end.  Churchill, himself an Anglo-American, was reported to have been deeply 
upset by the lack of American presence in the post-Great War Europe; he noted that the 
“harmony & success of this co-operation form a clear precedent, & one which is of the highest 
value to the future in which such vast issues hang on unity between our two countries in ideals & 
in action.”4  Furthermore, Churchill went on to describe the ways that America “did not make 
good” on its promises to partner with Britain for the security of the European continent, showing 
an early example of the costly anarchic system that the governments of the two countries worked 
within.5  Following World War I, the onset and long duration of the Great Depression shifted 
American policy away from foreign interests and onto the state of its own economy and security. 
The outbreak of World War II in Europe created another chance for the United States and 
Britain to revive the bilateral ties that had been attempted after the conclusion of the First World 
War.  While officially neutral, the United States aided Britain against Nazi Germany “in all ways 
short of war”, which typically brought America some sort of strategic security or commercial 
advantage, creating an interesting foreshadowing effect of events to come.6  Further negotiation 
led to trades for destroyers and bases, as well as the Lend Lease Act, which extended an 
inexhaustible line of credit to Britain for the purchasing of wartime supplies, in exchange for 
freer access to global markets once dominated by Britain.7  These hints of pressure on Britain 
toward decolonization and future policy cooperation were officially laid down in the Atlantic 
                                                 
4 Gilbert. 90. 
5 Ibid., 95. 
6 Donnelly, Mark.  Britain in the Second World War.  New York:  Routlege, 1999. 97. 
7 Donelly., 98. 
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Charter, the product of the first wartime conference between Franklin Roosevelt and Winston 
Churchill, which established the foundations and guidelines for the future of the transatlantic 
relationship. 
The Atlantic Charter agreed to by Roosevelt and Churchill had two main roles, firstly 
including a blueprint of sorts for continued wartime cooperation.  Meeting in secret at Placentia 
Bay, Newfoundland, the two leaders effectively held the first wartime summit between heads of 
government and came away with “a means of waging a more effective war.”8  More importantly, 
the Charter served as a guideline for the desired postwar international order; Gilbert comments 
on the nature of this international aspect to the document, stating that Churchill had remarked 
about a paragraph “pledging an ‘effective international organization’ that would afford all 
nations security ‘within their own boundaries…without fear of lawless assault or the need to 
maintain burdensome armaments.’”9   
In addition, the Charter also spelled out the plan for self-determination after the war’s 
conclusion, by stating that it would support and “respect the right of all peoples to choose the 
form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-
government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.”10  Within this clause, 
the underlying costliness to any agreement and the lack of enforcement in compliance is made 
clear: at the time Britain presided over the largest empire in history, with little intention of 
ending its authority at the war’s end.  Even at the time Churchill viewed the clause as referring to 
those peoples under the harsh rule of Nazism or other totalitarian regimes.11  Roosevelt and 
Churchill had clearly different ideas on the British Empire and its life expectancy; Wilson 
                                                 
8 Gilbert, 234. 
9 Gilbert, 232. 
10 Ibid., 232. 
11 Stewart, Andrew.  Empire Lost.  New York:  Continuum US, 2008. 84. 
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imparts that the prime minister and other like-minded imperial thinkers viewed the Empire in 
romantic terms, whereas Roosevelt saw its possessions, particularly India, as fully oppressed, 
potentially disloyal subjects unlikely to aid the war effort without some genuine award at the 
end.12  While it is clear that Churchill did not want to lose the United States as an ally and 
presumably went along with the stipulations of the Charter in order to secure Britain’s future 
security in the war effort, this clause became a central theme of the postwar decolonizing world 
in which the United States exerted a great deal of pressure on Britain to end its influence over its 
colonial possessions. 
From the Atlantic Charter, and the Allied victory over the Axis Powers some four years 
later came the special relationship between the two countries that has since been kept alive 
through to the present by a variety of convergent interests on both domestic and foreign areas, as 
well as strong partnerships between heads of state and government.  Where the special 
relationship has triumphed in military alliance, cultural progression, economic benefits and 
mutual respect, it was also one of the constituent factors in breaking down Britain’s global 
empire and reducing it to its current great, but not super, power status within the international 
system.   
The decline of the British Empire, which shifted into high gear after the perilous 
economic and security state that Britain found itself in following World War II, was the product 
of a number of dysfunctional factors that yielded little positive results for the mother country.  
Hyam marks the most important of these factors as including “Indirect Rule, a white man’s 
country, an imperial palace, an international language, and the ‘special relationship’ with the 
USA,” highlighting the preeminent placement of United States pressure on Britain during the 
                                                 
12 Wilson, Theodore A.  The First Summit:  Roosevelt and Churchill at Placentia Bay, 1941.  Lawrence:  University 
Press of Kansas, 1991. 109. 
 7
decolonization period.13  While the attempts at establishing semi-autonomous government within 
certain colonies like India and Nigeria, along with mandatory English instruction, are important 
in explaining this demise, the British governments’ sights were constantly fixed upon United 
States’ policy, often misinterpreting its intentions or objectives.14  As a result, unilateral 
decisions based upon United States policies were often taken, with Britain being swept along for 
the ride as on a one-way street.  In the cases used to evaluate this paper’s thesis, these 
misinterpretations caused by noncompliance or disseverance of the agreements in place between 
the two countries prove the clearly different points that have been taken on decolonization and 
military intervention. 
III. Literature Review of Cooperation Themes 
 States enter into agreements with other states based on a number of important factors.  
Commonly, alliances are formed for defense, or negotiations brokered for increased economic or 
social opportunity, in order to increase a state’s own security or utility.  Agreements are typically 
only made, however, when some sort of benefit is expected to be gained by the states in question.  
An emphasis on initial bargains and negotiations, coupled with a record of compliance to the 
deal, are necessary for both states to derive their benefits; according to Leeds, “when actors are 
deciding whether to propose and form agreements to coordinate policy, they consider the 
likelihood that the agreement will be fulfilled and the costs to be borne should the agreement be 
broken.”15  As a result, agreements can be difficult, if not impossible to reach if there are deeply 
conflicting interests or benefits that the negotiating states might hold or incur for entering into 
agreements too hastily, making some agreements more costly than others. 
                                                 
13 Hyam, 12. 
14 Ibid., 13. 
15 Leeds, Brett Ashley.  1999.  “Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International 
Cooperation.”  American Journal of Political Science 43 (4): 982. 
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 A number of researchers have put forth their own hypotheses and results for the emphasis 
on the costliness of agreements, beginning with the methods by which states negotiate 
agreements.  Fearon’s bargaining model specifically cites delays in negotiation or agreements as 
being extremely costly, as the increase of the time past without the potential benefits of an 
agreement, and increases the risk that one side might end any agreement negotiations.  This “war 
of attrition” can be detrimental to an agreement between states before it has even been enacted.16  
In addition, Fearon notes that “expectations about what will happen in the enforcement phase 
will affect how the states bargain.”  If the agreements are not enforceable, then no incentive can 
exist for the states to effectively bargain with any sort of serious intent for a constructive 
outcome.17 
 Lacking proper enforcement for agreements can make them costly due to the effect of 
noncompliance by the participating states.  If the international system of states is agreed to be 
anarchic, then it is clear that there are no inherent enforcement mechanisms existing to ensure 
that states comply with the agreements that they make.  Although it is typically expected that 
states will comply to some extent with the agreements that they have made, the exact level can 
never really be empirically determined.  Compliance problems additionally do not have to be an 
intentional decision to violate the terms of an agreement; rather, they can be the result of 
uncertain or ambiguous treaties, limitations by states to adhere to agreements, or social or 
economic policies and fluctuations.18  Containing deviations or discrepancies within agreements 
to “acceptable levels of compliance” is therefore an easier and more effective way of enforcing 
                                                 
16 Fearon, James. 1998.  “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation.”  International Organization 52 
(2): 277., 
17 Ibid., 279. 
18 Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, Peter N Barsoom.  1996.  “Is the Good News about Compliance Good 
News about Cooperation?”  International Organization 50 (3): 392. 
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the agreements, rather than keeping to every clause and provision.19  By not reaping all the 
potential benefits of following the exact terms, however, abridged or abbreviated agreements can 
have the potential to be quite costly for either state involved. 
 Treaties and agreements that do not change the participating states’ policies too 
drastically are another source of noncompliance, yet without overt consequences.  Downs, et. al, 
propose that because most treaties only require states to deviate slightly from what they would 
have done otherwise, states are “presented with negligible benefits for even unpunished 
defections; hence the amount of enforcement needed to maintain cooperation is modest.”20  Such 
agreements may therefore not be necessary to be enforced, but also run the risk of lax adherence 
as a result of the similarities between the policies pursued both before and after the agreement.  
As the research presented here proves, the potential costliness of an agreement to a state and its 
welfare, raised from concerns over bargaining, benefits, and compliance, comprises a central 
theme within the domain of interstate cooperation.   
While the initial costliness of an agreement may prevent states from initial cooperation, 
there are other theories that explain the existence of continuing cooperation among states that 
have already entered into agreements.  According to liberal theorists, the cooperation among 
states within bilateral agreements of under the framework of international organizations occurs 
due the concept referred to as the shadow of the future, which imparts that states are more likely 
to cooperate in the short term if they are likely to benefit from the agreement or relationship in 
the long term.21  States can expect to continue to rely upon each other or continue to interact with 
each other into the future, and as a result “international politics is characterized by the 
                                                 
19 Chayes, et. al., 198. 
20 Downs, George W., et.al., 380. 
21 Bueno de Mesquita, 142. 
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expectation of future interaction.”22  The shadow of the future conceptual model relies upon the 
“prisoner’s dilemma” game in deriving its theory.  The prisoner’s dilemma problem finds that 
two players in a game or interaction are better off if they defect and cooperate with each other; 
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita states that “by choosing rationally they each suffered an outcome that 
was worse than what they would have gotten if they had cooperated.”23 If there is sufficient time 
to recover from a setback or wrong decision that a player makes, then mutual cooperation is far 
more beneficial than going against the goals of the other player.  This proper coordination 
outcome of prisoner’s dilemma creates an atmosphere convenient for the shadow of the future 
theory to be effective. 
 Other theorists describe the shadow of the future phenomenon as not only making 
enforcement easier in the future but also making agreements harder and more difficult to make.  
This can lead to more intensive bargaining in order for states to achieve a better result; Fearon 
notes that “though a long shadow of the future may make enforcing an international agreement 
easier, it can also give states an incentive to bargain harder.”24  He also suggests that more 
bargaining for the promise of more future gains can cut back on the relative gains that a state 
could achieve in the present, leading to a breakdown in cooperation.25  The shadow of the future 
is therefore important in determining the motivations for cooperation between states but has a 
double effect of impeding negotiations that establish such cooperation. 
 Under the auspices of the shadow of the future and further cooperation, research has 
shown that democratic states are less likely to conflict with each other and more likely to engage 
in cooperation that will last for longer periods.  Known as the democratic peace, the studies 
                                                 
22 Oye, 12. 
23 Ibid., 143. 
24 Fearon, James. 1998.  “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation.”  International Organization 52 
(2): 270. 
25 Ibid., 296. 
 11
argue that liberal democracies rarely fight wars, reach peaceful settlements and are more 
constrained in their abilities to wage war as more influential world powers.26  The democratic 
peace or reliability is quite important when referring to the special relationship of the United 
States and Britain; as democratic states, the two countries are far more likely to cooperate even 
when disputes between them arise.  Democratic states are additionally viewed as being reliable 
in their ability to hold to agreements; Gaubatz derives a number of reasons for this theory, 
including preference and policy stability and the consistency of democratic leadership and 
institutions.  Public preferences within liberal democracies are liable to be very stable; under the 
auspices of majority rule for government, public opinion is not easily swayed nor quickly 
changed.  For governments to stay in power, they have to abide by the popular support of the 
people that they govern.27  Additionally, constraints on terms in office and public approval of 
leaders, as well as the natural stability of liberal democracy government organization and 
bureaucracies are more likely to increase the chances of cooperation in the future.28  Democratic 
reliability for future cooperation and interaction show a more positive shadow of the future than 
cooperation between non-democratic states. 
 The shadow of the future can additionally be used to describe the nature in which both 
domestic and international institutions coordinate their activities and function effectively to 
guide the development and execution of their policies.  The core premise of liberal international 
relations theory holds that “the relationship between states and the surrounding domestic and 
transnational society in which they are embedded critically shapes state behavior by influencing 
                                                 
26 Bueno de Mesquita, 437. 
27 Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor.  1996.  “Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations.”  International 
Organization  50 (1): 114. 
28 Ibid., 116-7. 
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the social purposes underlying state preferences.”29  Within one state’s government, policies are 
shaped by the people that it represents, especially in the case of elected democracies; domestic 
groups follow their interests and agendas by putting pressure upon the government to enact 
policies that are favorable to them.30  Moravcsik goes on to cite the necessity of pushing for 
policies that are outside of the influence of the private sector:  “Government policy is therefore 
constrained by the underlying identities, interests, and power of individuals and groups (inside 
and outside the state apparatus) who constantly pressure the central decision makers to pursue 
policies consistent with their preferences.”31  The leaders that retain their offices and coalitions 
that are built as a result of international cooperation are subject to be removed or discredited 
should an international agreement go without compliance; as a result, while they remain 
accountable for the agreements, they are more likely to abide by them.32  Domestic institutions 
remain extremely important in establishing the agendas and policies for governments to follow 
when making agreements with other states. 
International institutions are generally made up of three or more states that serve to 
organize and execute agreements among its members; they range in size from broad 
organizations such as the United Nations, to smaller groups such as the G8.  Institutions are 
created in order to achieve beneficial cooperation among the member states, but can also be 
ineffective because there is usually no superior central judge or authority that polices the 
organizations.33   At an international level, individual governments use these institutions to 
maximize the agendas set by their own domestic interests and pressures while minimizing 
                                                 
29 Moravcsik, Andrew.  1997.  “Taking Preferences Seriously:  A Liberal Theory of International Politics.”  
International Organization 42: 516. 
30 Putnam, Robert D.  1988.  “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics:  The Logic of Two-Level Games.”  International 
Organization 42: 434. 
31 Ibid., 518. 
32 Leeds, 986. 
33 Bueno de Mesquita, 488. 
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foreign influence or pressure.34  Organizations can have primary economic goals, such as the 
OPEC group of petroleum producing countries, be in place for political cooperation, such as the 
United Nations, or else have defensive purposes, such as NATO.  However, they all serve as 
checks on their constituent states in order to ensure policy cooperation.   
The international structure of these institutions can be a decisive factor in ensuring that 
agreements are kept; according to Fearon, the theory usually “understands international regimes 
primarily as institutional solutions to problems of monitoring and enforcement.”  However, the 
more states are involved with any decision or policy-making, the shadow of the future and 
associated costs or rewards will be increased as well.35  Shadow of the future is a key factor in 
determining a state’s reliability and commitment to an agreement, especially when concerned 
with democratic peace, domestic institutions, and international institutions. 
Alliances that are created between states for mutual security benefits are a core method of 
committing to agreements, and will be central to the cases presented in this thesis detailing the 
United States and Britain.  According to Bueno de Mesquita, alliances can be made between two 
or more states for military purposes, as an agreement “concerning the actions each will take in 
the event that a specified military contingency occurs.”36  As a result, alliances are viewed as 
being beneficial for all parties involved; they serve as “tools for aggregating capabilities against 
a threat; nations form alliances to increase their security by massing their capabilities against a 
common enemy.”37  Alliance agreements can be structured differently, in such forms as 
neutrality pacts, defense agreements, or collective security promises, but all intend to prevent or 
dissuade military aggression or use of force.   
                                                 
34 Putnam, 434. 
35 Fearon, 297-298. 
36 Bueno de Mesquita, 529. 
37 Morrow, James.  1991.  “Alliances and Asymmetry:  An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of 
Alliances.”  American Journal of Political Science 35 (4): 904. 
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The participating states’ forces or strength within an alliance, however, may not always 
be equal; in fact, nearly all alliances that exist today are asymmetric, or one in which the 
different states contribute or receive different amounts of autonomy or security under the terms 
of the agreement.38  Asymmetry in alliances usually leads to more stability due to the differing 
costs and benefits incurred by the participating states; according to Morrow, “Because the two 
sides in asymmetric alliances derive their benefits from different interests, they strike a more 
stable bargain of interests than those in symmetric alliances.”39  There is a strong collection of 
evidence that the United States and Britain cooperate within such an asymmetric alliance: the 
United States is stronger militarily than Britain and brings more military forces or strength to its 
security; while Britain gains these protective measures, it must also comply with United States 
policies concerning its foreign policy.  This relationship will be further illustrated by the case 
studies. 
Preferences and pressure comprise the final area of cooperation theory and help in the 
formation of clear ideas of the mechanics behind the United States-Britain relationship.  
Preferences involve the policies or agendas that states intend to uphold or deliver upon; they can 
be created by public mandate, government or military action, and so forth; Moravcsik relates that 
“States require a ‘purpose,’ a perceived underlying stake in the matter at hand, in order to 
provoke conflict, propose cooperation, or take any other significant foreign policy action.”40  
Pressure in negotiation of agreements is the manifestation of such preferences: in the Atlantic 
Charter conference, for example, Franklin Roosevelt lobbied strongly for Britain to begin a 
process of decolonization upon Allied victory in World War II; this preference took the form of 
pressure on Britain for compliance in exchange for continuing the delivery of American aid to 
                                                 
38 Bueno de Mesquita,  535. 
39 Morrow, 905. 
40 Moravcsik, 520. 
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their war effort.  While pressure is often an effective means of ensuring that a state’s intentions 
are met, it is only truly successful if that state has more power, either in bargaining or within an 
agreement framework, to back up the pressure that it places upon another state.  If the state does 
not have the means to stand by its preferences as such, then adverse consequences may be 
incurred; Oye notes that “unilateral actions that limit one’s gains from exploitation may have the 
effect of increasing one’s vulnerability to exploitation by others.”41 
Such unilateral action outside of preexisting agreements taken by the United States and 
the United Kingdom throughout the post-war era forms the basis of the cases presented in this 
paper to show the costliness that reneging on these agreements on each country.  Based on these 
theories of compliance, shadow of the future, institutions, alliances, and preferences, the paper 
will detail the lapses in compliance to agreements on decolonization and military action between 
the two countries.  These breakdowns in cooperation are few; as both the United States and 
Britain employ systems of liberal democracy, hold the same values and norms, and share a long 
military alliance, incidents of such pressure are naturally rare.  And although the impact of such 
conflicts is likely to be smaller than a conflict between two enemy states, there are still important 
conclusions to be drawn from the events. 
IV. Theoretical Basis for Cooperative Behavior 
 After preferences and pressure are taken into account, the cooperative agreements in 
place between the United States and Britain achieve their strength and usual success through a 
careful calculation of estimated costs and benefits.  The governing principle behind such a 
partnership, however, lies with the theory of expected utility.  Utility as a single word can be 
broadly defined as usefulness or having useful qualities or benefits; expected utility, therefore, 
involves the expected overall benefits that a state can reasonably project to receive as a result of 
                                                 
41 Oye, 10. 
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complying with an agreement; leaders, legislators and policy-makers must be able to effectively 
calculate expected utility in order to predict their payoffs and anticipate how the opposite side 
will act in the event of different stimuli.42  These stimuli, or situations that create the potential 
for either side to renege on the agreement, have to be responded to properly in order to maintain 
the relationship or agreement between the states.  If a decision is misjudged or the other play
underestimated, then the state can possibly incur costly consequences as a result of such 
incorrect comprehension of the situation. 
er 
                                                
 The United States and Britain, just as other countries with successful bilateral relations, 
act according to the expected utility theory in their policy- and decision-making.  These 
decisions are often made without absolute knowledge that the other country will follow suit or be 
supportive; Bueno de Mesquita notes that “Expected utility estimates allow leaders to make 
calculated risks.  By assessing alternative consequences that might arise from a course of action, 
decision makers can compare the costs and benefits of those consequences with the costs and 
benefits associated with alternative courses of action.”43  Such assessments are vital to ensuring 
that states take courses of action that benefit their well-being the most.  Some of these decisions 
come with higher prospects of incurring either more costs or more benefits, giving them more 
elements of risk than decisions with less costly or beneficial outcomes.44  This inherent risk in 
decision-making can have the opposite effect of simply maintaining the status quo, however; if 
either state can receive a compensation that equals their currently expected utility, then they will 
likely refrain from acting on a risk that has the potential to diminish their benefits. 
 
42 Bueno de Mesquita, 88. 
43 Ibid., 88. 
44 McDermott, Rose.  Risk Taking in International Politics.  Ann Arbor:  The University of Michigan Press, 1998. 
11. 
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Numerous examples of actions taken with utility expected in return can be cited by both 
Britain and the United States throughout the history of the special relationship, from the 
decisions of the Allied commanders in World War II to later military action and issues over 
decolonization.  In most of these cases the expected utility on both sides is achieved, leading 
observers to tout the strength of the countries’ bond.  When larger risks are taken, though, the 
potential for negative backlash also becomes larger; because of the United Kingdom’s accepted 
status as the lesser partner in the asymmetric alliance, it usually incurs more costs than benefits 
from these riskier decisions, regardless if they are made in the intention of delivering a profitable 
outcome.  The United States, on the other hand, can usually meet its expected utility without 
resorting to heavier decisions or radical policy changes.  This imbalance within the relationship 
is documented in two clear cases where Britain took higher risks through the expected utility 
theory by challenging its accepted status quo with the United States in order to increase its 
benefits; in both cases Britain ended with more costs than when it began. 
V. Research Design 
As evidence to document the consistent presence of pressure from the United States on 
the United Kingdom to adapt and follow its policies, the paper will focus on two cases of 
international crises, both of which related to the effects of the decolonization of Britain’s once 
vast empire.  I have chosen to present these data in the form of intensive case studies because of 
the case study’s ability to present a single instance or outcome for the purpose of comprehending 
a larger amount of similar instances.45  In this way, these two cases are intended to represent the 
situations and yield similar results in other similar cases regarding United States pressure on 
Britain for compliance.   
                                                 
45 Gerring, John. 2004. “What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?” American Political Science Review 98: 
342. 
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The cases will take the form of a scientific explanation, which Lijphart says consists of 
two elements, including “(1) the establishment of general empirical relationships among two or 
more variables, while (2) all other variables are controlled, that is, held constant.”46  The 
controlled, or independent, variable remains unchanged throughout the cases, while the 
dependent variable fluctuates upon response to certain stimuli.  In order to hold other untested 
variables constant, the studies will eliminate those variables that are unimportant to the cases.47  
The independent variable for both cases will be the constant intentions and goals of the United 
Kingdom to maximize its benefits, as explained by the expected utility theory.  The dependent 
variable will be the response from the United States to Britain’s pursuit of such benefits, with a 
key emphasis on those negative interactions.  For the purposes of this paper, I will eschew any 
positive responses to Britain from the United States that this variable might invoke, because the 
cases are meant to show the asymmetric and imbalanced side of the Anglo-American 
relationship. 
The first case will study the Suez Crisis between Britain and Egypt in 1956 and the 
ensuing conflict that arose over ownership and operation of the Suez Canal.  The second case 
will review the United States-led invasion of Grenada in 1983 in order to depose a Communist 
insurgent government.  Although it can be argued that the United States had a negligible 
influence over Britain in the actual dismantling of its empire, mainly because of the economic 
benefit for the United States in keeping the empire together, America has had a strong effect on 
the military interventions and crisis management that has occurred in former British colonies 
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since they have become independent.48  These former colonies have evolved into many areas 
perceived by the United States as trouble spots in the Third World.  America’s refusal to 
cooperate with Britain in certain instances where Britain’s expected utility could be fulfilled and 
possibly increased have instead had the opposite effect, showing the single direction that the 
transatlantic alliance is often set on by the United States. 
VI. Case Studies  
The Suez Canal was built in the 1860s over the narrow strip of land connecting the 
Mediterranean and Red Seas between the Sinai Peninsula and the African portion of Egypt, and 
has forever since been a crucially important point for international trade, military campaigns and 
national interest.  Opening a route for much quicker trade between Europe and Asia, the canal 
was then, and still is today, an incredibly important resource.  Britain especially reaped the 
benefits of easier and faster trade with India, the jewel of its empire.  Although it had managed 
the canal since its opening, under the auspices and agreement of its status as a neutral zone, the 
British government had long since decided what traffic was allowed through the canal, 
effectively disregarding its aforementioned neutral nature.  After Egypt became independent 
under a British-installed puppet government, the canal management was officially given to 
Britain for a twenty-year period under a treaty signed in 1936.49  Upon that treaty’s expiration in 
1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser quickly moved to nationalize the canal under 
Egyptian control.  Fearing a loss of use or influence over the canal as the vital transportation link 
between Europe and Asia, Britain, along with France and Israel, moved for a military action 
against the Egyptians to regain control of the Suez Canal territory. 
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 The United States’ response to Britain’s handling of the conflict ranged from an initial 
recommendation to hold diplomatic negotiations to a later outright criticism of the British 
government ministers for their decision to use force against the Egyptians.  Evidence for this 
preference on the part of the United States can be found clearly from written records of the 
event; early communication between Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and the British 
ministers reads that “Eisenhower’s text ‘refers not to the going through the motions of having an 
intermediate conference, but to the use of intermediate steps as a genuine and sincere effort to 
settle the problem and avoid the use of force.’”50  Although the British did agree to act in a 
diplomatic setting before reverting to brute military force against the Egyptians, they did so 
under the assumption that the United States would back their policy of renegotiated control of 
the canal, which shows a clear study in risk taking for higher benefits based on Britain’s 
expected utility.  This blunder by the British government in predicting the actions of the United 
States ultimately led to a breakdown in communication between the two allies, leaving Britain to 
wait for a positive signal to begin military action that was never to come from the United 
States.51 
 American pressure on Britain to stand down from the conflict against the Egyptians came 
largely as a surprise and unexpected action to the British government and military command.  
Depending upon quiet economic assistance but not military support, the British government 
predicted that the United States would not act in a negative fashion.52  This pressure manifested 
itself as a Unite States-sponsored resolution at the United Nations for a withdrawal of aggressor 
forces from the Suez region; without the United States support, Britain, France and Israel were 
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unlikely to have succeeded in their goal to liberate the canal from Egyptian control.  The 
miscalculation of British ministers on the subject United States policy and response led to a 
relatively quickly end to open hostility; Selwyn Lloyd, the British foreign minister, wrote later 
that “not to have the Americans at least winking and benevolently neutral was unthinkable.”53  
Britain suffered fairly intense consequences from not complying with the United States and 
leaving the Suez alone; the cabinet within Eden’s government was reorganized, oil shortages 
became the norm, and their financial system underwent a minor collapse.54  United States 
pressure on Britain to comply, therefore, very clearly led to a reaction in the form of an ultimate 
cessation of military action and giving up any claims for control over the Suez Canal. 
This argument can of course be critiqued by providing alternative explanations for the 
British failure to regain control of the Suez Canal.  Such factors as poor military execution by the 
Western forces, and Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden’s desire for an ideological triumph over 
Nasser, regardless of the cost, have been cited as possible reasons.55  Although it is unlikely, the 
Suez Canal may have become less lucrative method for the British government to raise money.  
Despite these conjectures, however, the negative response given by the United States to Britain’s 
pursuit of benefits, whether it was the fruit of anti-colonial policies or other factors, is most 
clearly the leading factor in their failure to reestablish control over the Suez Canal and return the 
area to the status quo ex ante. 
The second case concerns the United States-led Operation Urgent Fury, a military action 
undertaken to liberate the Caribbean island of Grenada, a Commonwealth Realm of the United 
Kingdom, from a communist government that had overthrown the previous government and was 
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threatening the safety of American citizens in the region.56  Independent since 1973, Grenada 
had undergone a coup in 1978 that brought Maurice Bishop, leader of the authoritarian New 
Jewel Party, to power.  His murder in 1983 and subsequent unrest directly led to the invasion by 
United States forces in order to restore security to the island for its American residents and e
its potential for becoming another Soviet satellite state in the Western Hemisphere.  Although th
invasion was criticized in various international circles, especially by Britain, the United States 
pressure in this instance prevented Britain from acting.  Britain had only one year previously 
defended its South Atlantic territory of the Falkland Islands from an Argentine invasion; it 
expected in this case not necessarily to benefit but to at least preserve its status quo with Grenada 
as an integral part of the Commonwealth, a Realm ruled by a Governor-General in the Queen’s 
stead.  The American invasion challenged the expected utility that Britain wanted to maintain in 
its relationship with Grenada. 
nd 
e 
                                                
 The United States managed to handle the invasion, ensuing conflict and completion of its 
goals in Grenada without much recourse from the international community; the speed and 
immediate success in overtaking the island and ousting the government proved that their policies 
were clear and actions strong.  Prior to the invasion, a senior official stated that “the overriding 
principle was not to allow something to happen worse that what we were proposing to do.  The 
purpose was to deny the Russians/Cubans a feeling of potency in grabbing small vulnerable 
states in the region.”57  After the invasion, the United Nations moved to condemn the action, as 
well as the governments of other neighboring Western Hemisphere nations.  British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher personally decried the conflict, stating that the United States “had no 
business interfering in [the Commonwealth’s] affairs,” a clear sign that Grenada, as a former 
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colony and a current Commonwealth Realm under the British monarchy, should have been left 
alone by the United States.58  Yet among all the rhetoric from international organizations and 
leaders, especially from Britain, no action was taken against the United States, most likely due to 
pressure placed upon them to comply.  This compliance can be shown by quiet approval from 
other ministers from states or international organizations, stating that the invasion was necessary 
to preserve the peace in the region; one such minister from Latin America remarked that “We 
have to protect…And I cannot overlook the fact that the Caribbean nations not only joined the 
intervention but asked the U.S. for it.”59  The Grenada invasion succinctly provided an example 
of United States pressure on Britain to not intervene in its unilateral decisions, even those 
pertaining to a specific former colony and Commonwealth partner.  Britain’s aggressive reaction 
notwithstanding, their policies clearly converged to toe the line to the United States’ demands 
and actions in Grenada. 
 The most glaring critique of the Grenada case study stems directly from the fact that 
Britain clearly would have invoked more costs if it had acted against the United States than it 
would had it remained outside the action; indeed, the Grenada incident had no real observable 
impact upon British policy or the well-being of the state.  As referenced, other Caribbean 
nations, of which some are also classified by Britain as Commonwealth Realms, were supportive 
of the invasion for their own national security reasons.  Regardless of the presence of American 
pressure, therefore, Britain had very few options for action that would have elevated it to a 
better, more beneficial status than before.  Nevertheless, the fact that Britain did not attempt to 
interfere within the affairs of one of its own Commonwealth Realms is most clearly attributed to 
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the negative recourse that it might have incurred as a result of going against the accepted policies 
of the United States. 
VII. Conclusion 
 The eighteenth-century American colonists that declared their independence from Great 
Britain in 1776, and created a new country based on liberalism and natural rights, had probably 
very little intention that their experiment in democracy would claim as its closest twentieth-
century ally the very kingdom it once sought so ardently to sever itself from.  Yet for nearly 
seventy years, the special status of the relationship between the United States and the United 
Kingdom has grown from wartime ally to supporting partners in policy and action around the 
world.  During his address to the United States Congress in March 2009, British Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown solidly affirmed his country’s recognition of its closest partner, stating “I come in 
friendship to renew for new times our special relationship that is founded on our shared history, 
our shared values, and, I believe, our shared futures.”60  With this cooperation, however, comes 
costs and benefits based on the expected utility the states wish to achieve; and while both 
countries usually incur strong benefits from their partnership, the costs of cooperation, both 
actual and opportune, on the British side routinely appear to be greater than those incurred by 
America. 
 Regardless of the cut and dried analysis, however, is it not acceptable for the two 
countries to continue reaping their benefits even with the discrepancies in the costs?  Both states 
look to the other and with few exceptions, like those incidents reviewed in the case studies, 
receive support with their military, economic and political agendas; the current and future 
benefits associated with such agreements should logically far outweigh any exorbitant costs.  Yet 
both the United States and Britain should be wary of the unsupervised status quo.  Without some 
                                                 
60 Brown, Gordon. Address to Joint Session of United States Congress.  4 March 2009. 
 25
give and take leeway expected of any successful partnership, Britain may find itself without the 
security provided by the United States, and America may find itself in turn without the support 
of its most common and consistent ally.  The cases in the paper show that the events that have 
occurred in the past and have the potential to occur in the future can throw off that support and 
push the countries apart.  The ramifications of a break in such an alliance have the potential to be 
disastrous for not only the preservation Anglo-American cultural norms and values but also for 
the well-being of the greater international system.  If the potential costliness of agreements are 
not forgotten nor ignored by either of the two countries, however, then the special relationship 
between the English-speaking peoples on both sides of the Atlantic will continue to thrive and 
achieve great accomplishments far into the future. 
